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RENTAL HOME SWEET HOME: THE DISPARATE 
IMPACT SOLUTION FOR RENTERS EVICTED 
FROM RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURES 
David Lurie 
ABSTRACT—At the end of the last decade, a drastic spike in residential 
foreclosures brought unprecedented attention to the damage that mass 
foreclosure often brings to primarily low-income, minority–majority 
communities. Much of this attention—in both the media and in the legal 
arena—has been devoted to homeowners disadvantaged by predatory loans 
and other unsavory practices. However, a recent body of scholarship has 
shown that the brunt of mass foreclosure often falls on renters, who often 
have little or no procedural protection from speedy and unexpected eviction 
from their homes, regardless of lease status or tenure. This Note argues that 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision to affirm disparate impact liability 
under the Fair Housing Act provides a promising but unexplored legal hook 
to challenge these mass eviction practices and ensure meaningful 
protections for tenants in foreclosed properties.   
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INTRODUCTION 
It is a common enough story: a family rents a home, has months left 
on the current lease, and pays every month’s rent on time, yet they wake up 
one morning to find an eviction notice posted outside their home—or worse 
still, a sheriff knocking at the door. Unbeknownst to them, the landlord 
who owns the home fell behind on the mortgage, or paid too little in 
property taxes, and the home is now in foreclosure. They may have lived 
there for years as model tenants, doing everything asked of them by the 
lease, but these facts are not important. Nor, in many cases, is their lack of 
prior knowledge about the foreclosure or planned eviction.1 The tenant 
family is only collateral damage. 
This scenario plays out all over the country,2 across jurisdictions with 
widely varying tenant protections. Its victims disproportionately live in 
 
1 Many states require, at the minimum, that tenants be notified of the foreclosure or given extra 
time before eviction. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1701(h) (2014) (requiring a supplemental 
petition to evict any occupants not personally named in the foreclosure, and mandating up to a 120-day 
delay before eviction). Other states have much less robust protection. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 426.530 (West, Westlaw through 2016 sess.) (permitting the purchaser at a foreclosure sale to 
“receive an immediate writ of possession”). 
2 See, e.g., Creola Johnson, Renters Evicted en Masse: Collateral Damage Arising from the 
Subprime Foreclosure Crisis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 975, 975–76 (2010) (describing a case in Baltimore, 
where state and federal law ultimately helped the tenant delay the eviction); Henry Rose, The Due 
Process Rights of Residential Tenants in Mortgage Foreclosure Cases, 41 N.M. L. REV. 407, 407–08 
(2011) (describing one such eviction in Chicago); Péralte C. Paul, Law Helps Renters Forced Out When 
Landlord Defaults, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Nov. 9, 2009, 6:37 AM), 
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low- and middle-income households, precisely the groups most likely to 
experience difficulty finding adequate and affordable new housing in an 
increasingly expensive national rental market3—especially if they cannot 
recoup the security deposit on their present home.4 In many jurisdictions, 
they are also disproportionately minority households.5 Foreclosure-related 
eviction of tenants, then, not only harms unsuspecting families and 
exacerbates housing instability within the neighborhoods most impacted by 
the foreclosure crisis, but also fits into a historical trajectory of housing 
practices whose effect is to economically disenfranchise families of color.6 
Scholars have advocated for additional anti-eviction protections through 
common law doctrines7 or due process lawsuits,8 but these approaches have 
had only incremental and intermittent success.9 
One promising but unexplored avenue opened when, in March 2015, 
the Supreme Court released its decision in Texas Department of Housing & 
 
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/law-helps-renters-forced-out-when-landlord-default/nQY5Q/ 
[https://perma.cc/4ZRJ-B8WB] (describing a case in Sandy Springs, GA); Jim Piggott, Undisclosed 
Foreclosure; Surprise Eviction, NEWS4JAX (Jul. 15, 2013, 10:00 PM), 
http://www.news4jax.com/news/undisclosed-foreclosure-surprise-eviction/20986050 [https://perma.cc/ 
4WN9-4492] (describing a case in Jacksonville, FL). 
3 See ALLISON CHARETTE ET AL., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., 
PROJECTING TRENDS IN SEVERELY COST-BURDENED RENTERS: 2015–2025, at 6–7 (2015), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/KSPProd/ERC_Upload/0100886.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN4B-FNLB]. 
4 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 983 (“The overwhelming majority of renters are not refunded their 
security deposits or the remainder of the current month’s rent previously paid to the landlord.”). 
5 NAT’L COMM’N ON FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING: 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FAIR HOUSING AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 68 (2008), 
http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/reports/future_of_fair_Housing.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2WFZ-GFCQ ] (“African Americans and Latinos—and neighborhoods of color—will bear the harshest 
consequences of the foreclosure fallout.”). 
6 For one of the most prominent recent discussions of the impact of historic American housing 
practices on black Americans, tracing from slavery through segregation and redlining, see Ta-Nehisi 
Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC, June 2014, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631 
[https://perma.cc/6X6K-UWGY]. 
7 See, e.g., Charles C. Cornelio, The Effect of Anti-Eviction Statutes on Foreclosing Mortgagees, 
4 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 361, 368 (1985) (suggesting that the implied warranty of habitability should 
protect tenants from interference by foreclosing banks); Florence Wagman Roisman, The Right to 
Remain: Common Law Protections for Security of Tenure: An Essay in Honor of John Otis Calmore, 
86 N.C. L. REV. 817, 819 (2008) (arguing that litigants should press for common law tenure security, 
which requires a landlord to have good cause to terminate a tenancy); see also Gerald Korngold, 
Whatever Happened to Landlord-Tenant Law?, 77 NEB. L. REV. 703, 708 (1998) (noting that the “shift 
to a legislatively dominated regime” starting in the late 1970s left “fewer opportunities for breakthrough 
judicial decisions”). 
8 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 2, at 409 (arguing that due process requires protections beyond those 
offered by the federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act, which expired following the article’s 
publication). 
9 Some states have recognized, for example, that a writ of assistance, which would allow a 
foreclosing mortgagee to evict tenants not actually joined in the foreclosure, violates due process rights. 
See, e.g., Gibbs v. Kinsey, 566 N.Y.S.2d 117, 117 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). 
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Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.10 In Inclusive 
Communities, the Supreme Court held that the Fair Housing Act11 
encompasses disparate impact liability for practices with discriminatory 
effects, regardless of whether the practice has discriminatory intent.12 It was 
hardly a watershed decision, as all eleven federal circuits that had 
considered the question agreed on the viability of Fair Housing Act 
disparate impact claims,13 but Inclusive Communities did serve several 
important functions: it silenced commentators who took the granting of the 
certiorari petition without a circuit split as a sign that the Fair Housing 
Act’s disparate impact days were numbered, it clarified the applicable test, 
and it reinforced the Court’s apparent hesitancy to apply the doctrine 
broadly due to concerns over racial quotas and equal protection issues.14 
This Note will argue that Fair Housing Act disparate impact after 
Inclusive Communities can readily encompass tenants in foreclosure, even 
under a relatively conservative interpretation of the doctrine.15 While the 
Court has signaled a reticence toward broad expansions of the doctrine, 
evictions of faultless tenants speak to the primary concerns of both 
disparate impact theory and the Fair Housing Act, while avoiding the 
Court’s central concerns about expansive application of the doctrine. 
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I traces the evolution of 
American renting habits and landlord–tenant law to accommodate modern 
housing realities—a process that has largely overlooked tenants in 
foreclosure. Part I also explores the foreclosure crisis and its aftermath, as 
well as the often wide-ranging economic and personal cost for tenants in 
foreclosed properties and their communities. In light of these trends, both 
legislative action and common law doctrines have proven inadequate to 
 
10 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
11 Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012)). 
The Act made it illegal to deny or refuse housing based on protected categories, including race. 
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). For a more thorough discussion of the Act, see infra Section II.A. 
12 135 S. Ct. at 2525. 
13 See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM & SARA K. PRATT, NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALL., DISPARATE IMPACT 
UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: A PROPOSED APPROACH 6–7 (2009) (detailing the most important 
cases in all eleven numbered circuits endorsing disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act as of 2009, 
as well as relevant case law in the D.C. Circuit). 
14 135 S. Ct. at 2522–25 (describing the applicable test and its limits); id. at 2523 (noting “serious 
constitutional concerns” with a too-broad application of disparate impact). 
15 With any argument for extending the disparate impact doctrine, there is some risk of straying 
into the realm of liberal wishful thinking. As noted by Professor Michael Selmi, “scholars have offered 
numerous proposals to extend the disparate impact theory to cure all manner of social ills; extending the 
disparate impact doctrine has long been one of the primary obsessions of liberal academics and 
advocates alike.” Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 
704 (2006). With such concerns in mind, this Note will attempt to justify tenant-in-foreclosure 
applicability even under a narrow view of the disparate impact doctrine. 
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bring tenant-in-foreclosure policies up to date with other important tenant 
protections, disproportionately harming tenants of color through reliance on 
outdated property principles. 
Part II discusses the trajectory of disparate impact case law and its 
application to the Fair Housing Act, as well as the relevant Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations, Inclusive 
Communities, and other important housing disparate impact cases. Part III 
then demonstrates that the Fair Housing Act, HUD regulations, and case 
law all support applying disparate impact liability to the foreclosure-related 
eviction of tenants with active leases. Part III shows that the Court’s recent 
concerns about disparate impact suggest a first threshold step in 
establishing a disparate impact case, and demonstrates that the case for 
tenants in foreclosure satisfies both this initial step and the three-part 
burden-shifting test from Inclusive Communities. Because foreclosure laws 
and practices in many jurisdictions cause a statistical disparate impact, lack 
legally sufficient justification, and have less discriminatory alternatives, the 
Fair Housing Act provides a potentially powerful weapon against sudden 
displacement of renters in foreclosed properties. 
I. RENTERS AND THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 
A. A Crisis in Tenant Security 
In 2015, the U.S. homeownership rate fell to its lowest level since 
1967.16 Due to a combination of tightened financing for homebuyers,17 lack 
of personal savings,18 poor credit,19 and changing demographics,20 more and 
 
16 Kathleen M. Howley, U.S. Homeownership Rate Falls to the Lowest Level Since the 1960s, 
BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2015, 9:14 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-28/u-s-
homeownership-rate-falls-to-lowest-since-the-1960s [https://perma.cc/4KNA-LSQ3]. 
17 See, e.g., Dina ElBoghdady, Is the Government Making It Harder for the Middle Class to Buy 
Homes?, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/09/05/
when-the-government-makes-it-harder-for-the-middle-class-to-buy-houses [https://perma.cc/9UMK-
LSHK] (noting that “lenders are turning away potential home buyers by demanding unusually high 
credit scores and other tough standards” beyond what the government requires). 
18 Andrew L. Yarrow, Americans Low Savings Rate a Bad Sign for Good Economy, FISCAL TIMES 
(Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/04/26/Americans-Low-Savings-Rate-Bad-Sign-
Good-Economy [https://perma.cc/2A42-KZ9Y] (“Forty-four percent of Americans are either in debt, 
have no savings at all, or have only enough savings to tide them over for up to three months if they lose 
their jobs . . . .”). 
19 See, e.g., Dionne Searcey, More Americans Are Renting, and Paying More, as Homeownership 
Falls, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/24/business/economy/more-
americans-are-renting-and-paying-more-as-homeownership-falls.html [https://perma.cc/3GUM-ELDQ] 
(“Many people living in rentals were once owners; they lost their homes to foreclosure and now have 
such damaged credit reports that they find it nearly impossible to qualify for a mortgage.”). 
20 Immigration, geographic mobility (especially among millennials), and the growing income gap 
have all had significant impact on American rental trends. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF 
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more Americans are renting their homes.21 This trend seems poised to 
continue, even as rental costs reach historic highs.22 In short, renting is no 
longer—if it ever was—a temporary stepping stone to the American Dream 
of homeownership. It is a fixture of American life, particularly for lower 
income families and people of color.23 
The rising cost of renting, coupled with a shortage of affordable rental 
stock in many cities,24 make it increasingly difficult to locate affordable 
housing—particularly on short notice, as when a sudden eviction causes 
involuntary displacement. Beyond the logistics of securing new housing, 
this involuntary displacement takes a well-documented psychic and social 
toll on families and communities alike.25 Thankfully for renters, various 
common law and statutory safeguards protect against invidious disruption 
of tenancies. 
The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw some incremental 
expansion in tenants’ rights, but courts and legislatures generally provided 
scant protection for tenants facing conditions or habitability issues,26 and 
the common law in many jurisdictions still upheld the right of landlords to 
 
HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY 5–9 
(2008), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/rh08_americas_rental_housing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U8VM-6V4R]. 
21 CHARETTE ET AL., supra note 3, at 6 (“We are now seeing more renters than at any other time in 
U.S. history.”). 
22 Id. at 6 (observing that in 2013, nearly half of all renters were “cost burdened,” paying more than 
30% of their income on housing costs—roughly double the rate in 1960); see also id. at 9 (“Since 1982, 
with the exception of a five-year period in the late 1990s, rent growth has consistently outpaced 
inflation.”); Emily Badger, Why the Homeownership Rate Will Keep Falling—and Falling, and Falling, 
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/
06/16/why-the-homeownership-rate-will-keep-falling-and-falling-and-falling/ [https://perma.cc/QY6T-
Q58Z] (noting that the growth in rental households is expected to continue through 2030). 
23 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: MEETING 
CHALLENGES, BUILDING ON OPPORTUNITIES 17 (2011), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/
jchs.harvard.edu/files/ahr2011-3-demographics.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2P5-3JPR] (“By 2010, 
approximately 70 percent of renter households had incomes below the national median and more than 
40 percent had incomes in the bottom quartile.”); id. at 16 (“In 2000, 39 percent of renters were 
minorities. From 2001 to 2010, minorities contributed 81 percent of the 3.9 million growth in the 
number of renter households.”). 
24 See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 20, at 13. 
25 See, e.g., Marc Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation, in URBAN 
RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 359, 359–61 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966); Roisman, 
supra note 7, at 820–29. 
26 See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. 
L. REV 503, 516 (1982) (describing nineteenth-century common law, which required rent payments 
even if the property was destroyed by fire or flood); Paul Sullivan, Note, Security of Tenure for the 
Residential Tenant: An Analysis and Recommendations, 21 VT. L. REV. 1015, 1029 (1997) (observing 
that the move toward housing condition-based tenant protections started in earnest after the Great 
Depression). 
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evict tenants through self-help.27 The 1960s and 1970s saw significant 
shifts in landlord–tenant law,28 particularly in the popularization of tenant-
favorable common law doctrines,29 the influence of the nonbinding 
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,30 increased recognition of 
tenants’ due process rights against eviction,31 and Congress’s passage of the 
Fair Housing Act, which outlawed rental discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.32 
This reevaluation of tenants’ rights has not, however, been extended to 
the foreclosure context.33 Under the traditional property regime, tenants in 
foreclosure generally landed on the short end of the “first in time, first in 
right” principle: if the mortgage on a home predated the lease—which is 
usually the case—the lease became subordinate to the mortgage, so the 
foreclosure extinguished the lease and the tenant had no remaining right to 
the property.34 The national property regime has since seen a change toward 
 
27 See, e.g., Smith v. Reeder, 28 P. 890, 891 (Or. 1892) (“[A landlord] may enter and expel the 
tenant by force, without being liable to an action of tort for damages, either for his entry upon the 
premises, or for an assault in expelling the tenant, provided he uses no more force than is necessary and 
does no wanton damage.”). 
28 This shift has often been interpreted as a move from traditional property principles to contract 
principles in the landlord–tenant relationship. See, e.g., Cornelio, supra note 7, at 368 (“[C]ourts found 
contract law a more suitable model than property law for determining the rights and obligations of 
parties under residential leases.”). But see Glendon, supra note 26, at 503–04 (arguing that the 
“revolution” in landlord–tenant law was in fact only a culmination of various general legal doctrines 
that began to gain popularity in the twentieth century). 
29 These doctrines include the implied warranty of habitability, which makes the tenant’s obligation 
to pay rent conditional on the landlord’s maintenance of the premises in habitable condition, and 
protection against retaliatory eviction. See Javins v. First Nat. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970) (reading an implied warranty of habitability into the housing code); Schweiger v. Superior 
Court, 476 P.2d 97, 103 (Cal. 1970) (finding an implied right against retaliatory eviction in California). 
30 UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1974); see State Adoptions 
of URLTA Provisions, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/documents/
environ/STURLTAprov.pdf [https://perma.cc/KA5X-43Q8] (summarizing the Model Act’s major 
provisions and how many state legislatures adopted, modified, or rejected those provisions).  
31 See, e.g., La. State Museum v. Mayberry, 348 So. 2d 1274, 1276 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (holding 
that improperly served termination notice violated a tenant’s due process rights).  
32 Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 804, 82 Stat. 81, 83 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 
(2012)). 
33 Cf. Korngold, supra note 7, at 708 (noting that the tide of significant new developments in 
landlord–tenant law lost steam in the late 1970s). 
34 There is scant pre-1900s case law regarding tenants in foreclosure, but it was well established 
that a tenant’s rights to property necessarily extinguished along with the landlord’s. See, e.g., 
McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580, 590 (Cal. 1860) (“The right of the lessor to the possession ends with 
the sale of the premises, or rather, with the deed by which the sale is consummated. The right of the 
tenant to such possession depends upon that of the lessor and goes with it.”); Barclay v. Picker, 38 Mo. 
143, 145 (1866) (“As a general rule, whenever the estate which the lessor had at the time of making the 
lease is defeated or determined, the lease is extinguished with it.”).  
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embracing parties’ contractual rights and duties35 over archaic subordinate-
interest principles, and several states’ laws already affirm the right of leases 
to continue after foreclosure.36 Nonetheless, some courts still hold to a strict 
interpretation of the “first in time, first in right” principle, which, in 
addition to extinguishing leases and allowing immediate eviction, also 
effectively strips tenants’ due process rights by rendering them trespassers 
in their own homes once the foreclosure is completed.37 Even if courts do 
not consider these tenants trespassers, many state laws still allow extremely 
short-notice evictions. According to the National Low Income Housing 
Coalition, as of 2015 thirty states had either no statutorily specified 
protection or required five or fewer days’ notice before tenants in 
foreclosed properties may be evicted.38 Despite the lease-destabilizing 
effect of the lease subordination rule and the inadequacy of other state 
laws, little effort was made on a national level to create updated protections 
for tenants in foreclosure until 2008, when a sudden boom in residential 
foreclosures brought foreclosure issues to the foreground of legal and 
policy debates.39 
 
35 See Korngold, supra note 7, at 705; Sullivan, supra note 26, at 1028 (suggesting that this shift 
began in the nineteenth century when “the national economy shifted from farming to industry”). But see 
Priya S. Gupta, The American Dream, Deferred: Contextualizing Property After the Foreclosure Crisis, 
73 MD. L. REV. 523, 525–29 (2014) (discussing how this modern tendency to “treat houses primarily as 
investments codified in contracts” can itself be dangerous). 
36 Various state laws directly contravene the lease-extinguishing power of foreclosure. See Vicki 
Been & Allegra Glashausser, Tenants: Innocent Victims of the Nation’s Foreclosure Crisis, 2 ALB. 
GOV’T L. REV. 1, 16–19 (2009) (describing state regimes in New Jersey, New Hampshire, California, 
and Washington, D.C., which provide various levels of additional protection). As will be discussed in 
Section I.B, the federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, which expired at the end of 
2014, provided a national (though temporary) solution. Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 702, 123 Stat. 1660, 
1660–61 (2009) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5220 (2012)). 
37 See, e.g., Mik v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 743 F.3d 149, 163 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that, 
under Kentucky law, a purchaser of foreclosed properties “may treat persons who occupy the property 
pursuant to a pre-existing lease as tenants, in which case he may charge them rent, or as trespassers, in 
which case he may evict them” via writ of possession, without filing an eviction action); Mills v. 
County of Lapeer, 498 F. App’x 507, 514 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a tax deed foreclosure can 
convert into a trespasser a tenant who does not have a property interest, and that the tenant therefore 
lacks due process rights, such as a right to a pre-eviction hearing). 
38 NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., PROTECTING TENANTS AT FORECLOSURE ACT (2015), 
http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/FactSheet_PTFA_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9CG-ABKS] (citing 
data from the National Housing Law Project). 
39 See James H. Carr & Kate Davidoff, Legislative and Regulatory Responses to the Foreclosure 
Crisis, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 283, 286–88 (2008) (describing the first 
wave of Federal Reserve and legislative responses, as they stood in early 2008). 
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B. A Foreclosure Epidemic, on Renters and Owners Alike 
The United States subprime mortgage crisis saw mortgage foreclosure 
rates rise to historic levels.40 Much of the attention given to the crisis has 
focused on its potential causes, and particularly on the predatory lending 
practices that led to many homeowners taking on loans they could not 
afford to pay.41 These practices themselves have been found to single out 
and disproportionately affect minority neighborhoods,42 and several efforts 
have been made to challenge lenders through litigation (including on the 
grounds that lending practices had a disparate impact on minorities).43 
Less attention has been paid to the impact of the foreclosure crisis on 
renters, who by some estimations constitute 40% of all Americans 
displaced by foreclosure.44 Some of this disparity in public attention may 
trace to class attitudes: middle- and upper-class Americans, in addition to 
renting less often and being less likely to face foreclosure themselves, are 
 
40 See LAWRENCE H. WHITE, CATO INST., HOW DID WE GET INTO THIS FINANCIAL MESS? 2 
(2008), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/bp110.pdf [https://perma.cc/XU8W-TENC]. 
The subprime mortgage crisis was, of course, entwined with a larger global financial crisis, and there is 
disagreement over when the housing crisis started and ended, with some observers suggesting that it is 
still ongoing. See, e.g., Paul Solman, Why the Foreclosure Crisis Isn’t Over Yet, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 
24, 2015, 4:45 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/foreclosure-crisis-isnt-yet 
[https://perma.cc/K37E-4HUQ]; Diana Olick, Repossessions Spike 66% as Foreclosure Crisis Lingers, 
CNBC (Oct. 15, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/14/repossessions-spike-66-as-
foreclosure-crisis-lingers.html [https://perma.cc/XJ2W-L75L]. 
41 See, e.g., Alex Kotlowitz, All Boarded Up, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 4, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/magazine/08Foreclosure-t.html [https://perma.cc/6M54-MSLW]; 
Nelson D. Schwartz, Can the Mortgage Crisis Swallow a Town?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/business/yourmoney/02village.html [https://perma.cc/HT3J-
5LGQ]. 
42 The National Low Income Housing Coalition found in 2009 that renters in minority communities 
were disproportionately impacted by the foreclosure crisis. DANILO PELLETIERE, NAT’L LOW INCOME 
HOUS. COAL., RENTERS IN FORECLOSURE: DEFINING THE PROBLEM, IDENTIFYING SOLUTIONS 4 (2009), 
http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Renters-in-Foreclosure-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR59-TEFA]. The 
Coalition confirmed this same trend again in 2012. SHAMBHAVI MANGLIK, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. 
COAL., RENTERS IN FORECLOSURE: A FRESH LOOK AT AN ONGOING PROBLEM 7 (2012), 
http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Renters_in_Foreclosure_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8MY-6MK5]; 
see also Nick Carey, Racial Predatory Loans Fueled U.S. Housing Crisis: Study, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 
2010, 7:44 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/04/us-usa-foreclosures-race-
idUSTRE6930K520101004#MuQo2XWmWS3e7Lpr.97 [https://perma.cc/F3S3-A6H8] (describing a 
study that found race to be a “powerful predictor[]” of subprime mortgage-related foreclosure). 
43 See Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for the Rise in 
Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1169, 1187–232 (2008). Johnson’s article 
discusses several cities’ efforts to sue lenders, including a disparate impact case against Wells Fargo by 
the city of Baltimore. Id. at 1198–212. This suit later settled, along with several other concurrent suits 
against the bank. Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Bias Charges, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/business/wells-fargo-to-settle-mortgage-discrimination-
charges.html [https://perma.cc/JY2L-2WKB]. 
44 See MANGLIK, supra note 42, at 1. 
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more financially capable of finding new rental housing,45 so they may see 
loss of rental property as a less serious or pervasive problem than poorer 
tenants. This indifferent attitude reflects the last few decades of housing 
policy, which has increasingly prized the investment-asset value of 
homeownership over more holistic conceptions of “home.”46 
A sudden eviction from one’s rented home poses a myriad of serious 
risks, particularly for lower income renters. Several scholars have 
documented at length the potential consequences of forced relocation on 
tenants, including school instability (which harms children’s academic 
performance), division of families, and severe emotional distress.47 Tenants 
evicted from foreclosed properties are unable to recoup their security 
deposits in as many as 80% of cases, and one study found that the “average 
family involved in a rental foreclosure filing faces $2,558 in costs.”48 
Without savings or family members to stay with, they face a particularly 
high risk of homelessness.49 Damage to neighborhoods from the resultant 
abandoned properties includes an increase in crime, elevated fire risk, a 
reduction in nearby property values, and a loss of local economic 
opportunity.50 Properties taken over by foreclosing banks are often 
 
45 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 983 (detailing the problems that lack of savings, a low credit rating, 
and high urban rental costs can pose). 
46 See Gupta, supra note 35, at 528–29. 
47 See Roisman, supra note 7, at 820–29; see also Fried, supra note 25, at 359–61 (describing the 
emotional impact of forced relocation on the residents of a West End Boston neighborhood, who 
reported a “moderate or extreme sense of loss and an accompanying affective reaction of grief”). 
48 DAVID ROTHSTEIN, POLICY MATTERS OHIO, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: RENTERS IN THE 
FORECLOSURE CRISIS 10–11 (2008), http://www.policymattersohio.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2011/09/CollateralDamage2008_0619.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QX4-8MU3]. Professor Creola Johnson 
also explains the economic consequences of lower income renters losing their security deposits: 
Without such a refund, tenants will need to quickly find enough money to pay a new security 
deposit, along with the first and, sometimes, last month’s rent. Besides security deposits, tenants 
need cash to cover moving expenses and utility deposits to obtain utility services at the new 
place. However, due to the current contraction of consumer credit, tenants may find reasonably 
priced credit unattainable and may resort to usurious credit such as payday loans in order to 
obtain cash to cover all of the relocation costs. 
Johnson, supra note 2, at 983. 
49 See NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS ET AL., FORECLOSURE TO HOMELESSNESS 2009: THE 
FORGOTTEN VICTIMS OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 14 (2009), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/ 
advocacy/ForeclosuretoHomelessness0609.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2UJ-DT4C] (“Those who have been 
living in foreclosed rental units are at particular risk, and have come to rank heavily among those who 
have become homeless.”). 
50 See James J. Kelly, Jr., Refreshing the Heart of the City: Vacant Building Receivership as a Tool 
for Neighborhood Revitalization and Community Empowerment, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & 
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 210, 210 (2004) (“[E]ach vacant building provides a haven for illegal activity, 
presents fire dangers to adjacent homes, and defames the surrounding neighborhood as an unfit place to 
live.”); Anne B. Shlay & Gordon Whitman, Research for Democracy: Linking Community Organizing 
and Research to Leverage Blight Policy, 5 CITY & COMMUNITY 153, 162 (2006) (“[A]bandoned 
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inadequately maintained, particularly in minority communities.51 Moreover, 
renters are not responsible for the default that causes foreclosure,52 and due 
to their short notice and regular lack of inclusion in the foreclosure 
proceedings, they often have little or no time to prepare to relocate.53 
In 2009, Congress responded to the mass eviction of tenants in 
foreclosure by enacting the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (PTFA), 
which provided a national standard of protection for tenants in foreclosed 
properties.54 These protections included at least ninety days’ advance notice 
before evicting tenants with bona fide leases and provisions for some 
tenants to live out the term of their leases.55 The PTFA, however, included 
a sunset clause, rendering it only a stopgap measure at the height of the 
foreclosure crisis.56 Congress allowed the PTFA to expire at the end of 
2014, leaving many tenants again subject to inadequate state eviction 
laws.57 
A potentially powerful solution to this legislative inattention arose a 
few months later, when the Supreme Court released its decision in Texas 
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc., affirming the viability of disparate impact litigation under the 
Fair Housing Act.58 As this Note will demonstrate in Parts II and III, 
disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act, as interpreted and limited by 
 
housing within 450 feet of property (about the size of a typical city block) lowered sales prices in the 
range of $3,542–7,627, all else equal.”). 
51 See NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALL. ET AL., THE BANKS ARE BACK—OUR NEIGHBORHOODS ARE NOT: 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE MAINTENANCE AND MARKETING OF REO PROPERTIES 2 (2012), 
http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/portals/33/the_banks_are_back_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Q2A-
B6YA]. 
52 Foreclosed homeowners may certainly be the victims of predatory lending practices, but the fact 
remains that foreclosure necessarily has a direct connection to a homeowner’s action or non-action: 
whether the terms of the loan are predatory or fair, the homeowner still “triggered” the risk of 
foreclosure by non-payment of the mortgage.  
53 See Been & Glashausser, supra note 36, at 15–16. 
54 Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 702, 123 Stat. 1660, 1660–61 (2009) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5220 (2012)). 
55 Id. § 702(a)(1). The Act defines a “bona fide” tenancy as one negotiated between nonfamily 
members, at arms length, for fair market rent. Id. § 702(b). Bona fide leases entered into before the 
notice of foreclosure were protected, except when the purchasers planned to use the premises as a 
primary residence, in which case ninety-day notice was sufficient. Id. § 702(a). 
56 Id. § 704. The original sunset date was December 31, 2012, but in 2010 Congress extended the 
sunset date to December 31, 2014. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. 111–203, § 1484, 124 Stat. 1376, 2204 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2012)).  
57 See Christopher A. Richardson, Tenants Are Left in the Cold After the Sunset of the Protecting 
Tenants in Foreclosure Act, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/ 
article/tenants-are-left-cold-after-sunset-protecting-tenants-foreclosure-act [https://perma.cc/BTP7-
XEF2]; Been & Glashausser, supra note 36, at 7 (“New owners have significant success in removing 
even tenants protected by federal or state laws.”). 
58 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015).  
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Inclusive Communities, provides an important opportunity for minority 
tenants to claim meaningful protections against foreclosure-related 
eviction. 
II. DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
A. Disparate Impact: “Fair in Form, but Discriminatory in Operation” 
The Supreme Court first endorsed the theory of disparate impact in 
1971, with its seminal decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.59 In Griggs, a 
group of black employees claimed that their employer’s use of intelligence 
tests and high school diploma requirements to inform job placement 
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,60 because such practices 
“operate[d] to disqualify Negroes at a substantially higher rate than white 
applicants.”61 The Court unanimously found that both the diploma and 
testing requirements violated Title VII: “If an employment practice which 
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job 
performance, the practice is prohibited,” regardless of whether the 
employer actually intended to disadvantage black employees.62 This theory 
of liability stood in stark contrast to claims based on the Equal Protection 
Clause63 or Title VII disparate treatment,64 which both require proof of an 
intent to discriminate. 
As interpreted by later cases, Griggs set out a three-step burden-
shifting analysis.65 First, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a 
prima facie case that a statistical disparate impact exists, and that the 
 
59 401 U.S. 424, 431–32 (1971). 
60 Title VII made it illegal for an employer to discriminate against, segregate, or classify an 
employee or applicant “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Pub. 
L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 253, 255–57 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 
(2012)). 
61 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426. 
62 Id. at 431–32. 
63 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (noting that a law is not “invalid under 
the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of 
another,” but requires further proof of invidious discrimination).  
64 See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) 
(explaining that disparate treatment is a question of discriminatory motive). Other courts had previously 
found Title VII to outlaw employment practices with discriminatory effects, for example, Local 189, 
United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 996–97 (5th Cir. 1969), but Griggs legitimized the 
rule. 
65 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577–78 (2009); Town of Huntington v. Huntington 
Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 17–18 (1988) (per curiam). 
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impact was caused by the challenged practice.66 If this burden is met, the 
defendant bears the burden of production to show that the challenged 
practice is a “business necessity” and “related to job performance.”67 
Finally, if the defendant successfully argues the business necessity of the 
practice, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that 
nondiscriminatory alternatives are available to achieve the same end.68 
The Griggs rule proscribes practices that are “fair in form, but 
discriminatory in operation” and lack a “genuine business need,”69 but 
today its scope of applicability is debatable.70 Scholars still regularly lament 
or applaud the doctrine’s relatively limited impact (at least compared to 
what some have advocated),71 as well as the Court’s refusal, in Washington 
v. Davis, to endow the doctrine with constitutional significance through the 
Equal Protection Clause.72 
The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts further limited the doctrine in 
several areas.73 In Alexander v. Sandoval,74 the Court held that Title VI of 
 
66 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 & n.6; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 
(1975) (interpreting Griggs to require that a “complaining party or class has made out a prima facie case 
of discrimination” before the case can proceed).  
67 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
68 See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425. 
69 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431–32. 
70 See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 493, 530 (2003) (“[T]he Court in cases after Griggs did not hold firmly to Griggs’s aggressive 
view of disparate impact doctrine.”). Today there are widely varying interpretations of how broad 
disparate impact’s reach is or should be. Section II.B and Part III will discuss these variations in the 
housing context and their implications for a potential tenants-in-foreclosure case. 
71 Notably, several major recent academic movements focus on the notion that, as forms of overt 
discrimination become less socially acceptable, it is increasingly important to recognize and address 
buried or unconscious forms of systemic discrimination. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew, Seeing Subtle Racism, 
6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 183, 217–18 (2010) (arguing that implicit “modern racism” should be 
incorporated into employment discrimination models); Justin D. Cummins, Refashioning the Disparate 
Treatment and Disparate Impact Doctrines in Theory and in Practice, 41 HOW. L.J. 455, 457–58, 467–
72 (1998) (suggesting that disparate impact should be reevaluated to include instances of white 
privilege, subtle injustices, and other systemic disparities); Jonathan Feingold & Karen Lorang, 
Defusing Implicit Bias, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 210, 228 (2012) (arguing that, due to implicit 
biases, blacks are more likely to be victims of violence than whites); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, 
The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 973 (2006) (discussing the “possibility of using the 
law to ‘debias’ people in order to reduce implicit bias”). For other suggested disparate impact 
applications, see infra note 119. 
72 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole 
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the [Equal Protection Clause of the] 
Constitution.”); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319–20 (1987) (detailing common critical reactions to the 
“motive-centered doctrine” articulated in Davis). 
73 It is worth noting that the Roberts Court did extend the right to disparate impact liability under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 
236–40 (2005) (plurality opinion), but denied recovery due to a reasonable “nonage factor” as provided 
under the statute. Id. at 239, 241; see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 4, 29 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
252 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which generally forbade “discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,”75 did 
not itself contemplate a private right of action for disparate impact claims, 
requiring separate statutory authorization.76 More significantly for the 
doctrine itself, a series of cases suggested a growing concern that disparate 
impact might come into conflict with both the Equal Protection Clause and 
disparate treatment doctrine—effectively inverting the various pre-Davis 
calls to read disparate impact into the Equal Protection Clause itself.77 
This series of cases culminated in Ricci v. DeStefano,78 a Title VII 
disparate treatment case that nonetheless had significant implications for 
disparate impact doctrine. In that case, the City of New Haven, 
Connecticut, administered a test to determine which of the City’s 
firefighters qualified for promotions.79 White applicants outperformed 
minority applicants, and under threat of lawsuit from both sides,80 the City 
decided to discard the test results.81 In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that 
the City’s decision to discard the test was a violation of Title VII’s 
prohibition on disparate treatment.82 Even though the decision was made to 
avoid disparate impact liability, it was based consciously on race (engaging 
in disparate treatment), and the employer lacked a “strong basis in evidence 
that the test was deficient and that discarding the results [was] necessary to 
avoid violating the disparate-impact provision.”83 While the Court declined 
to rule on equal protection grounds, many observers echoed Justice Scalia, 
who wrote separately that the majority was “merely postpon[ing] the evil 
 
U.S.C. § 623(f) (2012) (making an exception for discrimination “based on reasonable factors other than 
age”). It is possible that the arguably lower bar to defend a policy with disparate impact under the 
ADEA gave the Court less pause than, for example, the strict business necessity requirement under 
employment discrimination case law.  
74 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
75 Pub. L. No. 833-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 252, 252 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012)). 
76 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293. 
77 In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), a plurality of the Court expressed 
concern over the doctrine placing “undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic 
measures,” or requiring unconstitutional use of racial quotas. Id. at 992–93. Outside of disparate impact, 
the Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007), rejected the use of a race-based “tiebreaker” to determine school placement, id. at 733–35, and 
yielded a memorable if tautological statement of principle from Chief Justice Roberts: “The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” Id. at 748. 
78 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
79 Id. at 562. 
80 If, on the one hand, the City kept the tests in place, it could face a Griggs-type disparate impact 
lawsuit. On the other hand, if it discarded the tests based on racial considerations, it could face disparate 
treatment or equal protection claims. 
81 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 562. 
82 Id. at 593. 
83 Id. at 584. 
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day” when equal protection concerns will collide with disparate impact 
doctrine.84 
Ricci set a confusing precedent, seemingly limiting disparate impact 
liability without articulating a clear limiting principle. As Section II.B 
demonstrates, the Court’s next major disparate impact decision, Texas 
Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc., incorporated some of Ricci’s concerns without fully 
clarifying their import. 
B. Fair Housing Act Disparate Impact and Inclusive Communities 
The Fair Housing Act, enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1968,85 makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a 
bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or 
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of 
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”86 As early as 
1974, federal circuit courts interpreted the Act to prohibit disparate impact 
in housing practices, as Title VII did in the employment sphere.87 A Fair 
Housing Act disparate impact case did reach the Supreme Court in 1988, in 
Town of Huntington. v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, but both parties 
conceded to the applicability of the disparate impact test, so the Court did 
not address the question.88 
The Court did not directly address disparate impact under the Fair 
Housing Act until 2015, in Texas Department of Housing & Community 
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.89 In that case, a Texas-based 
nonprofit, the Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), claimed that Texas had 
disproportionally allocated federal low-income housing tax credits90 to 
 
84 Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring). For a thorough analysis of the history of—and tension 
between—disparate impact and the Equal Protection Clause, see Primus, supra note 70. Primus 
describes three “rounds” of the relationship between the two doctrines: first, asking whether equal 
protection contemplates disparate impact liability; second, asking whether Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to enact laws prohibiting practices with disparate impact; 
and third, asking whether equal protection forbids Congress from enacting such laws. Id. at 494–96. 
85 Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012)). 
86 Id. § 3604. 
87 The first major Fair Housing Act disparate impact decision came in United States v. City of 
Black Jack, which struck down a city ordinance that prohibited construction of any multifamily 
dwellings as having a disparate impact on black residents. 508 F.2d 1179, 1186–88 (8th Cir. 1974); see 
also Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1294–95 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(holding that a zoning decision with discriminatory effects is actionable under the Fair Housing Act, 
and remanding with instructions for factual findings about these effects). 
88 488 U.S. 15, 18 (1988) (per curiam).  
89 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
90 See 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2012).  
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predominantly black urban neighborhoods, with very few allocated to 
white suburban neighborhoods.91 According to ICP, this practice had a 
disparate impact on black residents by perpetuating racial segregation.92 
The district court applied a two-step analysis taken from the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Huntington: first, ICP had to make a prima facie case 
demonstrating statistical disparate impact, then the defendant needed to 
show that its actions furthered a legitimate governmental interest with no 
“less discriminatory alternative[].”93 
The defendant Department appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Between the 
district and appellate court decisions, however, HUD released regulations 
reinforcing its embrace of disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act, and 
articulating a three-part test that split the second “step” of the district 
court’s analysis into two parts.94 In HUD’s regulation, which roughly 
mirrored the three-step burden-shifting framework from the Griggs line of 
cases, the plaintiff bore the burden of demonstrating less-discriminatory 
alternative practices once the defendant proved a legitimate interest95 
(whereas in the district court the Department carried that burden). The Fifth 
Circuit followed the 2013 HUD regulations, and reversed and remanded for 
the district court to apply the HUD-sanctioned test.96 The Department 
appealed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari limited to the question whether disparate impact claims are 
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.97 
In the five years before Inclusive Communities, the Roberts Court had 
granted certiorari in two other disparate impact cases brought under the 
Fair Housing Act, one in 2011 and one in 2013, but both cases settled 
 
91 135 S. Ct. at 2514.  
92 Id. 
93 Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 860 F. Supp. 2d 312, 
322–23 & n.17 (N.D. Tex. 2012); see also Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 
844 F.2d 926, 939 (2d Cir.), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam). 
94 HUD’s regulations proscribe practices that “actually or predictably result[] in a disparate 
impact,” unless the practices are “necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory interests” that “could not be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory 
effect.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a)–(b) (2016). It is worth noting that HUD officially supported disparate 
impact liability in the lending context as early as 1994. See Policy Statement on Discrimination in 
Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266, 18,269 (Apr. 15, 1994). For a more thorough history of HUD’s recent 
approach to disparate impact, see SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 13, at 4–6. 
95 24 C.F.R. § 100.500. 
96 Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 275, 282–83 
(5th Cir. 2014). 
97 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 
(2015); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014) 
(granting certiorari). 
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before any decision.98 By granting certiorari a third time in five years, the 
Court seemed to suggest it was eager to weigh in on the issue. Moreover, 
by this point all eleven numbered federal circuits that had addressed the 
question agreed that the Fair Housing Act allowed disparate impact 
claims,99 and HUD had recently promulgated its regulation explicitly 
interpreting the Act to envision disparate impact liability.100 The repeated 
certiorari grants, the lack of a circuit split, and the 2013 HUD regulations 
led many observers to conclude that disparate impact liability under the 
Fair Housing Act was doomed.101 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court defied these expectations by holding—
albeit by a one-vote margin102—that the Act’s statutory language 
envisioned disparate impact liability.103 The Court affirmed the Fifth 
Circuit, and agreed with its incorporation of the HUD-approved burden-
shifting test: 
[A] plaintiff first must make a prima facie showing of disparate impact. . . . 
If a statistical discrepancy is caused by factors other than the defendant’s 
policy, a plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case, and there is no 
liability. After a plaintiff does establish a prima facie showing of disparate 
impact, the burden shifts to the defendant to “prov[e] that the challenged 
practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory interests. . . .” Once a defendant has satisfied its burden at 
step two, a plaintiff may “prevail upon proving that the substantial, 
 
98 Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), and 
cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012); Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of 
Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), and cert. dismissed, 
134 S. Ct 636 (2013). 
99 See SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 13, at 6–7. 
100 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 
11,460, 11,482 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2016)) (“Liability may be established 
under the Fair Housing Act based on a practice’s discriminatory effect . . . .”). 
101 See, e.g., Cornelius J. Murray IV, Promoting “Inclusive Communities”: A Modified Approach 
to Disparate Impact Under the Fair Housing Act, 75 LA. L. REV. 213, 216–17 (2014) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court appears destined to read disparate impact theory out of the FHA.”); Emily Badger, The Supreme 
Court May Soon Disarm the Single Best Weapon for Desegregating U.S. Housing, WASH. POST: 
WONKBLOG (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/01/21/the-
supreme-court-may-soon-disarm-the-single-best-weapon-for-desegregating-u-s-housing/ [https://perma. 
cc/U8FF-5BLQ]. 
102 In dissent, Justice Alito argued that the Act categorically does not create disparate impact 
liability. Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas wrote a 
separate dissent contending that the Griggs holding, and the disparate impact doctrine in general, should 
be dismantled. Id. at 2526–32 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
103 Id. at 2525 (majority opinion). As justification, the Court reasoned that the “results-oriented” 
phrase “otherwise make unavailable” in 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(a), included both intentional discrimination 
and actions that have disparate impact on protected groups, since the phrase “refers to the consequences 
of an action rather than the actor’s intent.” Id. at 2518. 
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legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice 
could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”104 
Despite endorsing disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act, 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion is suffused with caveats and cautionary 
language about straying from what he called the “heartland of disparate-
impact liability”105: disparate impact should not be used to “adopt racial 
quotas—a circumstance that itself raises serious constitutional concerns”;106 
“to impose onerous costs . . . merely because some other priority might 
seem preferable”;107 to mandate “displacement of valid governmental 
policies”;108 to interfere with anyone’s right to “make the practical business 
choices and profit-related decisions that sustain a vibrant and dynamic free-
enterprise system”;109 or to create a “double bind of liability” where 
defendants risk disparate impact or disparate treatment liability on both 
ends of a decision.110 Justice Kennedy did not, however, make clear how 
these general concerns fit within the three-step framework, either in the 
particular case or in disparate impact doctrine generally. 
Analysts differ widely on how to interpret the Court’s decision in 
Inclusive Communities. In light of the 5–4 opinion, Justice Kennedy’s 
various caveats, and the Roberts Court’s other major disparate impact 
decisions, some fair housing advocates viewed the decision as only a minor 
solace,111 while other commentators welcomed it as a major progressive 
victory.112 The most reasonable interpretation is that Inclusive Communities 
falls somewhere between those two extremes, embracing disparate impact 
as a viable tool against racial imbalances while also signaling—albeit 
somewhat vaguely—that there are limits to what the Court will entertain. 
What Inclusive Communities does provide, however, is a three-step 
test, accompanied by a sense for what red flags might lead the Court to 
 
104 Id. at 2514–15 (citing and quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c) (2014)). 
105 Id. at 2522. 
106 Id. at 2523. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 2522. 
109 Id. at 2518. 
110 Id. at 2523. 
111 See Garrett Epps, The U.S. Supreme Court Barely Saves the Fair Housing Act, ATLANTIC (June 
25, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/the-supreme-court-barely-saves-the-
fair-housing-act/396902/ [https://perma.cc/MGA6-8DW2] (“[I]t would be a mistake to read Inclusive 
Communities as a ‘liberal’ decision. . . . This was no ringing victory for civil rights; it was a near-death 
experience that may produce health problems for the Act down the road.”). 
112 See, e.g., Emily Badger, The Supreme Court’s Housing Decision Is a Warning Against Subtle 
Discrimination Everywhere, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 25, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/25/the-supreme-courts-housing-decision-is-
a-warning-against-subtle-segregation-everywhere/ [http://perma.cc/8KNK-E5DX].  
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reject an otherwise meritorious claim. As Part III of this Note discusses, the 
case for tenants in foreclosure speaks to the primary interests behind 
disparate impact, avoids the equal protection and racial quota issues that 
preoccupied the Court in Ricci v. Stefano,113 and satisfies the burden-
shifting framework. 
III. THE DISPARATE IMPACT CASE FOR TENANTS IN FORECLOSURE 
The case for tenants in foreclosure will differ depending on how the 
eviction process works in a jurisdiction, what entity sought to evict, and 
what law is controlling. In theory, a case could arise against a foreclosing 
mortgagee or against a local body or sheriff’s department; could challenge 
the actual eviction practice (the mortgagee’s, the sheriff’s, or some other 
participant’s) or a state or local law;114 could take the form of a private 
lawsuit, appeal of the eviction judgment itself (if the tenant is made a party 
to the eviction action or is allowed to intervene), or enforcement action by 
the Secretary of HUD or Attorney General;115 and could be heard by 
federal, state, or HUD administrative judges.116 Because the exact claim 
will differ across localities and individual circumstances, this Part will 
discuss the applicability of disparate impact analysis within a typical 
hypothetical locality with demonstrable racial disparities in foreclosure-
related tenant evictions (which existing research suggests apply quite 
broadly),117 rather than detailing a specific challenge to a particular state 
actor, mortgagee, or other party. This Part will also assume black renters as 
the disparately impacted group, but the same reasoning should support a 
case for any protected group that can demonstrate a significant statistical 
disparity caused by applicable foreclosure laws, mortgagee practices, or 
local government policies. 
Before Inclusive Communities, lower courts that embraced Fair 
Housing Act disparate impact applied liability fairly conservatively. 
Plaintiffs prevailed in as little as 20% of cases in lower courts, and even 
those victories were regularly reversed.118 As noted in Part II, the Court’s 
 
113 557 U.S. 557, 581–85 (2009). 
114 See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 
11,460, 11,474 (Feb. 15, 2013) (interpreting disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act to apply to 
both private and public actors). 
115 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612–3614 (2012). 
116 See id. 
117 See PELLETIERE, supra note 42, at 3–4. 
118 See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of 
Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 399 
(2013) (detailing low rates for plaintiff-favoring outcomes, and high reversal rates for those outcomes 
on appeal). Professor Seicshnaydre does note, however, that the lesser financial resources of many 
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cautious language suggests a more limited approach to housing disparate 
impact than some advocates had hoped.119 This Part argues that the Court’s 
various concerns about disparate impact are best seen as a threshold “step 
zero” test, inquiring into the nature of the case and requested remedy before 
moving on to the three-part burden-shifting analysis. The case for tenants 
in foreclosure satisfies this threshold test, and should prevail on the three-
step disparate impact framework in any area with significant demonstrable 
racial disparities in foreclosure-related eviction. 
A. Disparate Impact “Step Zero”: Constitutional Avoidance and the Fair 
Housing Act “Heartland” 
As discussed in Section II.B, the Court in Inclusive Communities 
repeatedly expressed concerns about overly broad application of disparate 
impact, without clearly articulating a limiting principle. The Court’s 
embrace of disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act, however, 
indicates its concerns are not fatal to the doctrine. Since some of the 
Court’s preoccupations in Inclusive Communities do not fit readily into any 
of the three steps of the burden-shifting framework, the most coherent and 
practicable interpretation of these preoccupations is that they constitute a 
kind of “disparate impact step zero,” an initial threshold step akin to the so-
called “Step Zero” test in Chevron agency deference cases.120 Detailing the 
parameters and full import of this threshold step for disparate impact likely 
warrants a more thorough treatment than will be given here, but the 
essential components of “step zero” are fairly straightforward: Courts 
should (1) identify the likely disparate impact remedy in a given case, (2) 
ask whether the remedy involves imposition of a racial quota or differential 
treatment (what this Note calls “disparate impact vs. disparate treatment”), 
 
plaintiffs, as well as the tendency to tack disparate impact claims onto disparate treatment cases, may 
influence these results. Id. at 392–93. One study has shown similar affirmance rates for defendants in 
civil appeals generally, but a higher affirmance rate for plaintiffs. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore 
Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable 
Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 947 (finding that defendants succeed in around 88% of plaintiff 
appeals, while plaintiffs succeed in around 67% of defendant appeals). 
119 For examples of advocacy for potential disparate impact cases in a variety of contexts, see Eric 
Dunn & Merf Ehman, The Probable Disparate Impact of Unlawful Detainer Records, WASH. ST. B. 
NEWS, July 2011, at 35 (use of detainer record in housing admissions); Allan G. King & Rod M. 
Fliegel, Conviction Records and Disparate Impact, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 405 (2011) (employing 
felons); Diane Piché et al., Remedying Disparate Impact in Education, HUM. RTS., Fall 2011, at 15 (the 
school achievement gap); Jimmy White, Comment, Environmental Justice: Is Disparate Impact 
Enough?, 50 MERCER L. REV. 1155 (1999) (siting of hazardous waste facilities). For a more exhaustive 
list of further articles in the same vein, see Selmi, supra note 15, at 703 n.12. 
120 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (2006) (describing this 
“Step Zero” in the agency deference context (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001)). 
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and (3) ask whether the remedy risks causing a different kind of disparate 
impact (“disparate impact vs. disparate impact”). If neither of the last two 
concerns are implicated, the claim can proceed to the prima facie case. 
The first of the Court’s primary concerns is the possibility that 
disparate impact remedies might conflict with equal protection and 
disparate treatment protections by mandating racial quotas or other policies 
that “perpetuate race-based considerations rather than move beyond 
them.”121 Justice Scalia’s warning in Ricci v. DeStefano of an “evil day on 
which the Court will have to confront”122 this question seems overstated as 
a broadside against disparate impact, since not all disparate impact cases 
raise these “disparate impact vs. disparate treatment” risks.123 Assuming 
such scenarios do raise serious constitutional ambiguity concerns centered 
on the Equal Protection Clause, courts can separate at “step zero” which 
individual cases do and do not create constitutional ambiguity. Courts can 
ask to what extent the requested change in practice is race neutral, and 
either use the constitutional avoidance doctrine to eschew particularly 
problematic cases,124 or rely on the Equal Protection Clause or disparate 
treatment to impute the need for a race-neutral remedy as a prerequisite for 
disparate impact cases. In the case of tenants in foreclosure, providing 
tenancy security after foreclosure does not require giving any advantage to 
black renters or neutralizing any advantage of white renters, so Justice 
Scalia’s warning need not interfere with the disparate impact analysis.125 
 
121 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523–
24 (2015).  
122 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
123 These concerns seem to be more acute in the employment testing context, where competition 
for positions is closer to a zero-sum scenario: neutralizing black workers’ advantage necessarily 
involves neutralizing white workers’ advantage. Similar concerns may cloud situations involving 
competitive application for loans or apartments. Many disparate impact remedies, however, do not 
involve applying counterweights to competitive processes. As Professor Richard Primus argues, even 
those that do involve reallocation of benefits may be unproblematic if helping the disadvantaged group 
is only a “motivating factor,” rather than the “predominant motive” behind the disparate impact-
avoiding adjustment. Primus, supra note 70, at 548. 
124 The constitutional avoidance canon provides that a potentially unconstitutional interpretation of 
a statute should be avoided where another interpretation is plausible. See LARRY M. EIG, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 23 
(2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K95-RRPB] (summarizing 
various articulations of the canon). 
125 One can plausibly make the more radical argument that there is some constitutional risk in the 
fact that disparate impact encourages actors to consider racial effects before making decisions, but such 
a position implies that disparate impact itself is unsalvageable. Inclusive Communities suggests that, 
while the Court is concerned about imposing liability “so expansive as to inject racial considerations 
into every housing decision,” 135 S. Ct. at 2524, at least five Justices do not consider this risk fatal to 
the doctrine. The “step zero” this Note advocates, then, takes a more moderate approach to these 
constitutional and doctrinal concerns. 
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The Court’s second major concern is the risk of penalizing good faith 
actors for making rational choices.126 Unlike “disparate impact vs. disparate 
treatment” issues, this concern can partially be dealt with in the “legally 
sufficient justification” prong of the disparate impact framework.127 The 
framework does not, however, address the “double bind of liability” 
scenario the Court mentioned in Inclusive Communities, where the 
defendant risks disparate impact or disparate treatment liability whichever 
way it decides an issue.128 If, for example, a minority-concentrated 
neighborhood has a large quantity of housing in a particularly poor 
condition, the municipality must either choose to condemn the poorly 
maintained properties and disproportionately evict minorities, or refuse to 
condemn and leave the minority neighborhood with disproportionately 
below-code housing.129 These “disparate impact vs. disparate impact” 
scenarios pose practical and judicial-competence problems, but like 
disparate treatment conflicts, they are not present in all cases. Allowing 
tenants to stay in their homes after foreclosure perpetuates some tenancies 
in segregated neighborhoods or poorly maintained buildings, but there is no 
liability double bind, because honoring a lease contract does not create 
liability for those disparities.130 In sum, the case for tenants in foreclosure 
avoids the Court’s recent doctrinal and constitutional concerns about 
disparate impact, so it survives the likeliest “step zero” limitations and 
should proceed to the prima facie case. 
Before discussing the prima facie case, however, it will be useful to 
briefly dispense with a few other arguable Fair Housing Act-specific “step 
zero” limitations, in light of Justice Kennedy’s somewhat puzzling 
language about the “heartland” of disparate impact doctrine. Inclusive 
Communities and prior case law suggest three axes of liability that might 
bear on this “heartland”: the statutory interest at issue (segregation or 
housing deprivation), the timing of the deprivation (front-end or back-end 
deprivations), and the type of practice or policy being challenged (housing 
barrier or housing improvement). First, it may be argued that the implied 
 
126 Id. at 2522–23 (reasoning that disparate impact does not require “displacement of valid 
governmental policies,” should not “force housing authorities to reorder their priorities,” and must give 
entrepreneurs “latitude to consider market factors”). 
127 See infra Section III.C. 
128 See Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2523. 
129 See id. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that in the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Gallagher v. 
Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), “even St. Paul’s good-faith attempt to ensure minimally 
acceptable housing for its poorest residents could not ward off a disparate-impact lawsuit”). 
130 There may be other potential disparate impact claims if, for example, the mortgagee in 
possession does not adequately maintain the property, but that result is not mandated by the court-
ordered continuation of the lease, so it is a wholly separate issue and does not raise double-bind 
problems. 
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“step zero” in Inclusive Communities limited this heartland of liability to 
“zoning laws and other housing restrictions that function unfairly to 
exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods without any sufficient 
justification”131—that is, to segregation cases. It is true that allowing renters 
to remain in foreclosed homes, particularly in already-segregated 
neighborhoods, does not directly serve the Fair Housing Act’s integration 
purposes the way zoning remedies do. The Act, however, serves both 
antidiscriminatory and integrationist purposes,132 and nothing in Inclusive 
Communities suggests that segregation should occupy a higher tier of 
liability than direct deprivation of housing. Direct deprivation actually 
adheres more closely to the Fair Housing Act’s plain language, which 
forbids “refus[al] to sell or rent . . . to any person because of race,”133 while 
zoning rules only circuitously “make unavailable or deny”134 any definable 
housing opportunity by creating a barrier to relocation. 
Second, the Court points to “the heartland of disparate-impact suits 
targeting artificial barriers to housing,”135 which may be taken as a sign that 
Fair Housing Act disparate impact applies more readily to practices that 
prevent a protected group from obtaining housing, as opposed to 
deprivations of existing housing. Inclusive Communities and standard 
refusal-to-rent cases (where a landlord’s policies keep out minority renters) 
are both examples of what might be called “front-end” housing 
discrimination, which limits the available housing options or denies the 
right to obtain a particular housing. The Act, however, also clearly 
contemplates “back-end” housing discrimination, which disproportionately 
deprives a protected group of already-obtained housing. The phrase 
“otherwise make unavailable”136 applies equally to “back-end” housing 
deprivation as to “front-end” housing denial, and HUD’s regulations 
explicitly reinforce that the statutory prohibition extends to “[e]victing 
tenants because of their race.”137 
Third, the Court in Inclusive Communities approvingly cited an article 
by Professor Stacy E. Seicshnaydre,138 which found that “housing barrier” 
cases—those that “deny minority households freedom of movement in a 
 
131 Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2521–22. 
132 See, e.g., Seicshnaydre, supra note 118, at 361 (noting the Act’s “twin purposes” of 
nondiscrimination and integration). 
133 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012). 
134 Id. 
135 Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2522. 
136 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). 
137 24 C.F.R. § 100.60(b)(5) (2016). 
138 135 S. Ct. at 2522. 
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wider housing marketplace”—have had markedly greater success in federal 
courts than “housing improvement” cases involving demolition, 
replacement, or condition improvement.139 This distinction maps uneasily 
onto back-end discrimination, seemingly relegating it to the “housing 
improvement” category even when the eviction is unrelated to 
improvement plans. In Professor Seicshnaydre’s view, the liability 
discrepancy exists because “housing barrier” cases almost always implicate 
both the integration and antidiscrimination purposes behind the Fair 
Housing Act, while “housing improvement” cases often lack a clear nexus 
with the Act’s integration purpose.140 A purpose-based explanation, 
however, seems inadequate to explain which cases in each camp succeed or 
fail, or how the twin-purpose analysis fits the disparate impact framework: 
either of Professor Seicshnaydre’s “purposes” should be an independent 
and sufficient basis for liability, and racially disparate deprivation in 
particular is arguably more plainly prohibited by the Act than are 
segregation-perpetuating practices.141 
The discrepancy in liability between housing barrier and housing 
improvement cases finds a more principled explanation in the “disparate 
impact vs. disparate impact” situation described above. Housing 
improvement-based cases often involve challenges to resident displacement 
as part of local revitalization or redevelopment plans,142 situations where 
the Fair Housing Act’s integration and nondiscrimination interests may 
actually work at cross-purposes. The foreclosure-related eviction of 
residential tenants is not part of any cognizable neighborhood development 
plan,143 and does not directly implicate the thornier questions that arise 
when resident displacement is balanced against attempts to otherwise 
improve those residents’ quality of life.144 Thus, a tenants-in-foreclosure 
 
139 Seicshnaydre, supra note 118, at 360–61, 363. 
140 Id. at 420–21. 
141 See SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 13, at 14–15 (describing the “perpetuation of segregation” 
theory as an offshoot of traditional, discrimination-focused disparate impact cases, and noting that 
either or both can be a basis for liability). 
142 See, e.g., Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729, 733–34 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(demolition of a low-income apartment complex as part of a redevelopment plan); Mt. Holly Gardens 
Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 377 (3d Cir. 2011) (replacement of 
low-income housing with higher end homes). 
143 For evidence supporting the insufficiency of the economic improvement rationale here, see 
infra note 176. 
144 Disparate impact claims may be more difficult when residents are displaced through plans to 
ultimately improve their quality of life. Notably, in recent years there has been voluminous debate 
among scholars and in the popular press about the effects of gentrification and similar phenomena and 
the extent to which they disadvantage poor and minority residents. Compare Vivian Yee, Gentrification 
in a Brooklyn Neighborhood Forces Residents to Move on, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/nyregion/gentrification-in-a-brooklyn-neighborhood-forces-
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case does not fall within the problematic “housing improvement” category, 
and any concerns about straying from the “heartland of disparate-impact 
liability”145 are adequately addressed by disparate impact “step zero.” 
B. The Prima Facie Case: Statistical Discriminatory Effect and Causation 
Plaintiffs in disparate impact litigation must make a prima facie case 
that a statistical disparate impact exists, and that the challenged policy or 
practice caused that disparity.146 It is often difficult to obtain exact statistics 
on foreclosure-related evictions because tenants are frequently not even 
parties to the foreclosure.147 However, courts have allowed reasonable 
inferences and conclusions to be drawn at the prima facie stage where there 
are some gaps in the available data.148 Neither the Court nor HUD has 
endorsed a particular statistical threshold for housing disparate impact,149 
but disparities in foreclosure-related tenant eviction (accounting for some 
level of imprecision) should clear a reasonably restrictive threshold in 
many jurisdictions. The statistical showings likely surpass, for example, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) “four-fifths rule” 
for Title VII claims, requiring a “selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic 
group which is less than four-fifths . . . of the rate for the group with the 
highest rate” to demonstrate an “adverse impact.”150 Taking the EEOC’s 
somewhat arbitrary threshold as a rough statistical guideline, and assuming 
that its applicability to a negative housing outcome would involve the 
inverse ratio, foreclosure-related eviction in many jurisdictions would have 
to demonstrate only that the practice or policy affects black renters at more 
 
residents-to-move-on.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9NYM-N4J3] (documenting the multitudes of 
tenants leaving the neighborhood of Crown Heights due to increased rent and poor conditions), with 
Lance Freeman & Frank Braconi, Gentrification and Displacement: New York City in the 1990s, 70 J. 
AM. PLAN. ASS’N 39, 51 (2004) (finding that gentrification in New York City actually led to slower 
resident displacement), and Laura Sullivan, Gentrification May Actually Be Boon to Longtime 
Residents, NPR (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/01/22/264528139/long-a-dirty-word-
gentrification-may-be-losing-its-stigma [https://perma.cc/LNX9-VJ65] (discussing two studies which 
suggest gentrification may be beneficial for long-term residents). Wherever one falls in this debate, the 
differences of opinion support some judicial wariness about invalidating policies that displace some 
minority households as part of plans to improve life in that neighborhood. 
145 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 
(2015). 
146 Id. at 2514. 
147 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 980–81. 
148 See, e.g., Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 835–36 (8th Cir. 2010) (allowing reasonable 
inferences and noting several other circuits that have done the same). 
149 See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 
11,460, 11,468–69 (Feb. 15, 2013). 
150 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (2015). For a more detailed discussion of the four-fifths rule’s history, 
implementation, and potential drawbacks, see STEPHANIE R. THOMAS, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF 
ADVERSE IMPACT: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 30–39 (2011). 
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than 125% the rate of white renters.151 The statistical proof will obviously 
differ depending on the locality, but several studies indicate that a high 
percentage of urban localities are likely to reveal racial disparities in 
residents facing tenant foreclosure well above a 125% threshold.152 
The more onerous half of the prima facie case is its “robust causality 
requirement,”153 the claimant’s “burden of proving that a challenged 
practice caused or predictably will cause” the statistical effect.154 The Court 
in Inclusive Communities reinforced its relatively conservative approach to 
disparate impact causality: for example, “[i]f a real-estate appraiser took 
into account a neighborhood’s schools, one could not say the appraiser 
acted because of race.”155 There is a measure of compromise and perhaps 
oversimplification inherent in such analysis, since any disparate impact 
causation, however immediate, implicates background social conditions 
and “factors other than the defendant’s policy”156 to a degree that typical 
tortious and criminal causation analyses do not. The Court asserted that the 
causality requirement “protects defendants from being held liable for racial 
disparities they did not create.”157 
Policies and practices that result in foreclosure-related eviction should 
satisfy even a rigorous causation requirement. It is true that mortgagees and 
other actors in the foreclosure crisis did not “cause” the relative prevalence 
of black renters, or the broad social disparities that disproportionately 
placed black renters in more vulnerable housing,158 but direct causation of 
the deprivation at issue is sufficient for the prima facie burden. After all, in 
Griggs the plaintiff satisfied its prima facie burden159 even though Duke 
Power Company did not cause disparities in black employees’ high school 
diploma attainment. Likewise, the plaintiff in Inclusive Communities 
 
151 The most likely form for this analysis would be to first compute the rates of foreclosure-related 
eviction for both black and white renters over a particular period of time. The rate for black renters 
would then be divided by the rate for white renters, and if the result is higher than 1.25 or some other 
court-set measure, then a statistical disparate impact has been shown. See generally THOMAS, supra 
note 150, at 33–34. 
152 For example, one study of four New England states found that the foreclosure rate in poorer, 
largely nonwhite neighborhoods was over five times the rate in white, low-poverty neighborhoods, and 
that over 30% of those impacted were renters. PELLETIERE, supra note 42, at 3–4. 
153 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 
(2015). 
154 Id. at 2514 (emphasis added) (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2014)). 
155 Id. at 2521. 
156 Id. at 2514 (“If a statistical discrepancy is caused by factors other than the defendant’s policy, a 
plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case, and there is no liability.”). 
157 Id. at 2523. 
158 At least, predatory lending practices that underlay the foreclosure crisis are likely too attenuated 
from the renters to qualify as persuasive causation evidence. 
159 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–32 (1971). 
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survived summary judgment160 even though the zoning decision did not 
cause the wealth disparities underlying blacks’ disproportionate need for 
affordable housing. Moreover, unlike situations where group preferences or 
personal decisions play a role in causing the disparity, there is also no 
meaningful intervening choice on the part of the renters that could prevent 
the deprivation.161 
As noted in Section III.A, some of Justice Kennedy’s language in 
Inclusive Communities might be read to suggest that policy and other 
considerations might complicate strict application of the prima facie case. 
After all, under a test like the EEOC’s “four-fifths” rule, large numbers of 
housing policies and actions will potentially clear the bar for statistical 
disparity and causation. Ultimately, though, the most logical course for 
preserving neutral application of the three-part test is to embrace the prima 
facie case as requiring only what it claims to: statistical disparity and a 
demonstrated causal connection.162 Indeed, in Ricci v. DeStefano, the 
Court’s strongest recent criticism of racial quotas, the majority conceded 
“that a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability [is] essentially[] a 
threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity and nothing more.”163 
A plaintiff who makes such a threshold showing and seeks a race-neutral 
remedy satisfies the prima facie requirement, shifting the burden to the 
defendant to justify its practice. 
C. Legally Sufficient Justification 
HUD’s regulations state that a statistical discriminatory practice “may 
still be lawful if supported by a legally sufficient justification.”164 Once the 
charging party makes its prima facie case, “the respondent or defendant has 
the burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve 
one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the 
 
160 Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 749 F. Supp. 2d 486, 500 
(N.D. Tex. 2010). 
161 Group preferences may warrant a weaker causal inference than the systemic economic duress 
that leads to differences in educational and housing opportunities. If, for example, black residents of a 
racially integrated community disproportionately preferred—for aesthetic reasons, and at the same price 
as other homes—a building material that turned out to be hazardous, causation analysis for the 
developer who sold the homes would likely require more than the mere agreement to sell to those 
(disproportionately black) buyers. Similarly, the existence of other causal factors relating to the 
plaintiff’s individual choices could cause courts to be wary of, for example, a disparate impact claim 
based on the correlation between race and criminal history, but see Dunn & Ehman, supra note 119, at 
37, though this could also be dealt with at the “sufficient justification” stage. 
162 Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2523. 
163 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (internal citation omitted). 
164 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2016). 
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respondent or defendant.”165 Various courts and academics, however, have 
historically differed on how high a burden the defendant bears,166 and 
Inclusive Communities did not give detailed treatment to the operative 
HUD language. The Court did note that this step is “analogous to the 
business necessity standard under Title VII.”167 But while Title VII cases 
yield a larger volume of precedent,168 they do not necessarily provide 
clearer guidance as to the level of scrutiny courts should apply.169 The 
standard is best understood as “impos[ing] a significant but manageable 
burden,”170 somewhere above a mere “legitimate business justification,”171 
but lower than “essential to the continued viability” of the enterprise, as 
some have advocated.172 
Beyond these general calibrations as to the onerousness of proving 
“sufficient justification,” it will be useful to unpack the HUD standard 
piece by piece. Breaking HUD’s language into three concrete action steps, 
the defendant is required to (1) identify one or more potential interests, (2) 
prove that they are substantial, legitimate, and nondiscriminatory, and (3) 
 
165 Id. § 100.500(c)(2). 
166 See Marcus B. Chandler, Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact 
Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911, 934 (1979) (considering the defense sufficient “[i]f an 
employer believes that his employment practices serve his business needs . . . whether or not his belief 
is factually correct”); Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact 
Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387, 388, 399 (1996) (preferring an “absolute necessity” 
requirement and setting out a four-element test); George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: 
An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1312–16 (1987) (advocating an 
intermediate standard, greater than a “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” but short of “scientific 
standards of validity” (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).  
167 Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2522; see also Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s 
Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,470 (Feb. 15, 2013) (“The requirement that 
an entity’s interest be substantial is analogous to the Title VII requirement that an employer’s interest in 
an employment practice with a disparate impact be job related.”). 
168 Compare Seicshnaydre, supra note 118, at 363 (finding ninety-two total Fair Housing Act 
disparate impact cases considered on appeal over a forty-year period), with Selmi, supra note 15, at 734 
(finding 130 reported appellate Title VII disparate impact cases in just six combined years).  
169 See Grover, supra note 166, at 387 (noting that the strictness of this stage is an “overarching 
issue” of Title VII jurisprudence).  
170 Rutherglen, supra note 166, at 1312. This is seemingly higher than the standard the Court 
articulated in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989), but multiple sources have 
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as superseding Wards Cove’s more defendant-friendly 
interpretation. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012)) (placing the burden on the employer to show the challenged practices 
are “consistent with business necessity”); Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (recognizing 
Wards Cove as superseded by statute); see also Primus, supra note 70, at 522 (“Congress in 1991 sided 
with the Wards Cove dissenters, placing the burden of persuasion on the business necessity issue 
squarely on defendants.”). 
171 See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660. 
172 See Grover, supra note 166, at 387. 
111:239 (2016) Rental Home Sweet Home 
267 
prove that the challenged practice is necessary to those interests.173 The 
interest at issue for foreclosure-related tenant eviction may differ 
depending on whether the defendant is a mortgagee or state actor. Broadly 
speaking, though, there are three plausible and potentially overlapping 
interests common to public and private actors alike: conveying free and 
clear title to facilitate efficient resale of the property unburdened by 
ongoing leaseholds; keeping mortgagees and other foreclosure-sale 
purchasers from becoming unintentional landlords after foreclosure; and 
passing on savings to consumers through reduced interest rates and 
mortgage costs.174 Notably, the desire to avoiding declining property 
values—a common rationale behind both housing-improvement and 
segregation-perpetuating practices175—actually works against the defenders 
of foreclosure-related eviction, because the mass evictions have left a blight 
of abandoned properties, often significantly harming neighborhood 
property values.176 
None of these interests are themselves inherently discriminatory, so 
this Section will focus on whether they are substantial and legitimate, and 
whether the challenged eviction practice is necessary to achieve them. To 
qualify as “substantial,” the proffered justification must be a “core interest 
of the organization that has a direct relationship to the function of that 
organization.”177 Broadly speaking, all three of the above interests are 
directly related to mortgagee practices and housing market regulation, so 
the importance of the interest will likely depend on evidence of a tangible 
benefit.178 The justification “must be supported by evidence and may not be 
hypothetical or speculative,”179 so it is not enough for a defendant to say, 
 
173 See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2016). 
174 These three interests may overlap where, for example, efficient resale keeps mortgagees from 
operating as long-term landlords, or increased revenue from a sale or upkeep avoidance is passed on to 
consumers. 
175 See, e.g., Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182, 1196 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(allowing the refusal of a construction bond despite statistical disparate impact, based on a property 
value protection argument). Zoning in particular is rooted in desire to protect property values. See 
William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. 
STUD. 317, 318 (2004) (“[Z]oning is best understood as an alternative to currently non-existent home-
value insurance.”). 
176 See Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-
Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 57, 58 (2006) (finding 
an average cumulative harm of $159,000 of each foreclosed building on nearby properties in Chicago); 
Shlay & Whitman, supra note 50, at 162 (finding that “small amounts of abandonment had large, 
deleterious consequences for house sales prices” in surrounding Philadelphia neighborhoods).  
177 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 
11,460, 11,470 (Feb. 15, 2013). 
178 See id. (stating that a substantial interest analysis “requires a case-specific, fact-based inquiry”). 
179 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(ii)(2) (2016). 
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for instance, that free and clear title makes it possible to resell at a higher 
price, unless that result demonstrably and regularly follows. Defining the 
line for “substantiality” may also involve some level of (at least implicit) 
interest balancing, since an interest and benefit may seem less substantial if 
it is significantly outweighed by the severity of the racial disparity and 
disparately applied harm.180 
Assuming the demonstrated interests are substantial, their legitimacy 
depends on the state or municipal eviction policy at issue, as well as the 
nature of the evidence offered. HUD defines “legitimate” to require 
“objective facts establishing that the proffered justification is genuine, and 
not fabricated or pretextual.”181 For all three proffered interests, state actors’ 
justifications may fail if the applicable laws that allow summary eviction of 
tenants in foreclosure are holdovers from old, agrarian policy principles or 
otherwise fail to consider foreclosure as a unique situation for tenants.182 
Post hoc justifications for laws and policies that simply overlook tenants 
should be less able to survive the “legitimacy” requirement, both because 
they are pretextual and because they do not respond to current housing 
realities.183 
Distinct problems also arise for each of the interests detailed above. 
The free-and-clear title interest is legitimate if the defendant can show 
demonstrable benefits to property value, but it may be pretextual or violate 
the “nondiscriminatory” requirement if there is a suggestion that the real 
interest is to replace minority tenants with white tenants. For the unwitting-
landlord justification, to the extent that disposing of tenants saves on 
maintenance and other property management costs, avoiding the basic 
building upkeep and supervision of one’s property mandated by many 
localities’ building codes184 and the common law185 is hardly a “legitimate” 
interest—particularly given extensive evidence that mortgagees regularly 
 
180 See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 940 (2d Cir.) (engaging 
in “balancing the showing of discriminatory effect against the import of the Town’s justifications”), 
aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam). 
181 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
11,471. 
182 See NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., supra note 38 (summarizing various states’ limited 
eviction protections for tenants in foreclosure). 
183 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 978 (“Even if a lender’s eviction of an innocent tenant is arguably 
grounded in the law, a blanket policy of evicting tenants is irrational given the current market 
realities.”). 
184 See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 13-12-126 (2016) (describing a mortgagee’s maintenance 
duties for vacant buildings). 
185 See Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 489–91 (2014) (summarizing 
various existing common law maintenance duties imposed on landowners). 
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fail to maintain abandoned properties in minority neighborhoods.186 The 
consumer-savings justification is legitimate facially, but only inasmuch as 
the defendant has proof independent of any savings accrued from the 
illegitimate interest of avoiding landlord and upkeep responsibilities. 
Proving legitimate savings may therefore depend largely on evidence that 
foreclosed buildings unburdened by tenants regularly and quickly yield 
higher sale prices, counter to documented effects of the evictions on the 
mass-vacancy and abandoned-property epidemic.187 
Finally, many mortgagees and state actors will have difficulty 
showing that prompt summary eviction of tenants is a “necessary” practice. 
The fact that several states and municipalities have enacted protections for 
tenants in foreclosure without disastrous results for banks or local 
governments weighs against a provable claim of real necessity.188 The 
inadequacy of the “necessity” argument becomes still more apparent when 
held against the tenants’ blamelessness in foreclosure scenarios, as well as 
the often startling racial disparity statistics and onerous social costs to both 
tenants and communities. While HUD does not require that a “necessary” 
practice have some nexus with the people it affects, it is natural to assume 
that a practice will be scrutinized more skeptically when the disparately 
impacted group has no fault or stake in the challenged practice. 
Homeowners impacted by foreclosure, for example, are disproportionately 
black and Latino,189 but while discriminatory practices may have 
contributed to this disparity, each homeowner signed onto a mortgage that 
he or she later could not pay. By contrast, tenants in foreclosure are 
collateral damage, lacking any culpability in the foreclosure, so a practice 
 
186 See NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALL., supra note 51, at 2 (finding that real estate-owned “properties in 
communities of color generally appeared vacant, abandoned, blighted and unappealing” while those in 
“[w]hite communities generally appeared inhabited, well-maintained and attractive to real estate agents 
and homebuyers”). It is true that that tenants sometimes cause additional costs by damaging and 
degrading the property, but this is hardly a justification for owners’ failure to perform routine 
maintenance, and tenants can still be charged for some damages to the property. 
187 See WILLIAM C. APGAR, HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION FOUNDATION, THE MUNICIPAL 
COST OF FORECLOSURES: A CHICAGO CASE STUDY 2 (2005), http://www.issuelab.org/ 
resources/1772/1772.pdf [https://perma.cc/RLP4-EK9V]; Johnson, supra note 2, at 987; NAT’L 
COMM’N ON FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 5, at 34. 
188 See Been & Glashausser, supra note 36, at 16–19 (detailing stronger protections in several 
states); Cornelio, supra note 7, at 380 (concluding that the effect of strong state laws on foreclosing 
mortgagees’ use value and investment-backed expectations is “not large”). But see Ryan K. Lighty, 
Landlord Mortgage Defaults and Statutory Tenant Protections in U.S. Foreclosure and U.K. 
Repossession Actions: A Comparative Analysis, 21 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 291, 305–06 (2011) 
(suggesting that the Massachusetts law requiring “just cause” to evict a tenant in a foreclosed property 
may be overly detrimental to stakeholders in the property). It is possible that necessity will be more 
easily proved by smaller lenders or other entities that can show substantial actual or likely pecuniary 
loss. 
189 See NAT’L COMM’N ON FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 5, at 68. 
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that displaces tenants and abrogates their bargained-for leases warrants 
higher scrutiny. 
Similarly, the magnitude of the deprivation at issue should tip the 
scales of “necessity.” As discussed in Section I.B, sudden loss of home is a 
private tragedy in itself, destabilizing families and causing dignitary harm 
in addition to the unexpected expense.190 For many low-income residents, 
moreover, short-notice eviction means more than a loss of one housing 
option. Finding equivalent housing may not be feasible in a short 
timeframe, particularly if the eviction becomes part of the tenant’s 
record.191 Even after locating housing, the same tenants disproportionately 
affected by foreclosure-related evictions are often those least able to take 
paid time off work, hire movers, or pay a new home’s security deposit, 
particularly if the last security deposit could not be recouped.192 Even free 
contract principles, normally a touchstone for opponents of fair housing 
regulations, do not speak strongly in the defendants’ favor: tenants cannot 
bargain for mortgage health in any practical sense, as it is much less 
apparent than physical conditions or neighborhood quality,193 yet there is no 
eviction-related common law analogue to the implied warranty of 
habitability’s minimum-conditions guarantee.194 
Even if courts decide that the actual magnitude of harm to plaintiffs is 
irrelevant doctrinally, harm to the surrounding communities and 
municipalities is surely relevant to the persuasiveness of the defendant’s 
necessity justifications. General expediency, dubious cost savings, and 
adherence to archaic property law absolutisms are insufficient to show the 
“necessity” of a practice that leaves vacant and unsupervised buildings, 
hurts surrounding property values, causes an increase in crime in and 
 
190 See Fried, supra note 25, at 359–61 (discussing the psychological effects of resident 
displacement); Gupta, supra note 35, at 556 (suggesting that “losses of homes during the Crisis were 
emotionally traumatic because people felt like they were losing parts of themselves”); Johnson, supra 
note 2, at 983 (describing costs incidental to unexpected eviction). 
191 See Dunn and Ehman, supra note 119, at 35–36 (describing the difficulty of finding new 
housing with an unexpected eviction on one’s record). 
192 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 983; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 48, at 11. 
193 In many jurisdictions, tenants may be able to track down a lis pendens indicating the start of the 
foreclosure process, but even sophisticated renters are unlikely to do so. See, e.g., How to Check Your 
Deed, COOK CTY. RECORDER OF DEEDS, http://cookrecorder.com/how-to-check-your-deed 
[https://perma.cc/N5H4-K4V6] (giving instructions for online lis pendens lookup in Cook County, 
Illinois). It may be argued that the sheer prevalence of foreclosure in certain lower income communities 
means that foreclosure risk is part of the lower rent bargain, but this ultimately becomes a perverse 
argument, using disparate impact itself as a defense against disparate impact. 
194 There are certainly eviction-related common law prohibitions—for example, forbidding 
retaliatory eviction—but nothing that directly proscribes unexpected tenancy termination, beyond the 
general notice requirements involving due process. See, e.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 
462 U.S. 791, 799–800 (1983). Even these basic notice requirements are limited or nonexistent in some 
states. See Mik v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 743 F.3d 149, 159 (6th Cir. 2014). 
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around abandoned buildings, slows local economic opportunity, burdens 
sheriffs’ departments, and generally allocates the cost and risk from the 
foreclosing party to the municipality.195 
D. Alternative Available Practice 
If the defendant shows a legally sufficient justification for its policy or 
practice, HUD’s regulation shifts the burden back to the disparate impact 
plaintiff to demonstrate “that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another 
practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”196 The interest that the 
alternative practice must serve will differ slightly depending on whether the 
particular plaintiff chooses to challenge mortgagee practices, local 
ordinances, state laws, or other policies implicated in foreclosure eviction, 
as discussed in Section III.C. Assuming the challenged practice survives 
the sufficient-justification stage, the interest behind that practice can be 
served by an alternate practice allowing for adequate time and notice 
allowances for renters, thereby avoiding racially disparate evictions. 
The ideal alternative practice for tenants facing foreclosure is not 
immediately apparent, as adequate tenant-protection measures have proven 
elusive to legislators, courts, and academics alike.197 The now-expired 
Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act gives a reasonable model for basic 
timing-and-notice standards, though the typical truncated process for 
eviction cases results in even enacted notice requirements being regularly 
ignored.198 That said, it may be unrealistic to expect courts to resolve 
pervasive summary-process iniquities or coin broad new tenure-security 
doctrines,199 especially as part of a disparate impact remedy. For tenants 
evicted during standard one-year leases, a compromise alternate practice 
based on sufficient advanced notice and the right to maintain bona fide 
one-year leases has the advantage of being proven practicable, without 
 
195 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 984–85 (“[A]id to innocent renters evicted by lenders unduly 
strains public and private resources.”); supra Section I.B. 
196 24 C.F.R § 100.500(c)(3) (2016). 
197 Recent literature has seen calls for security of tenure and “good faith” eviction limitations, see 
Deborah Hodges Bell, Providing Security of Tenure for Residential Tenants: Good Faith as a 
Limitation on the Landlord’s Right to Terminate, 19 GA. L. REV. 483, 484 (1985); Roisman, supra note 
7, at 819, allowing tenants to bring a “summary preliminary injunction” against eviction, Lauren A. 
Lindsey, Comment, Protecting the Good-Faith Tenant: Enforcing Retaliatory Eviction Laws by 
Broadening the Residential Tenant’s Options in Summary Eviction Courts, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 101, 101 
(2010), and expanded due process protections, Rose, supra note 2, at 409. 
198 See Rose, supra note 2, at 408–09; MARK SWARTZ & RACHEL BLAKE, LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR 
BETTER HOUS., LCBH 2009 REPORT: CHICAGO APARTMENT BUILDING FORECLOSURES: IMPACT ON 
TENANTS 11–12 (2010). 
199 But see Roisman, supra note 7, at 840–56 (advocating new common law doctrines for renters). 
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asking too much by way of judicial-procedural change. Such a solution 
could resemble the admittedly imperfect protections in the PTFA,200 but a 
disparate impact remedy has the advantage of yielding both injunctive 
relief and the possibility of damages (at least in particularly culpable or 
repeat-offender cases);201 by contrast, the PTFA was generally understood 
not to provide a private right of action,202 precluding a separate remedy for 
violations beyond dismissal of the eviction action, and state laws often do 
not provide penalties for notice-procedure violations.203 
The alternate practice is less clear for those living, as many lower 
income tenants do, with oral or shorter term leases. Tenants without leases 
were generally entitled to ninety-day notice under the PTFA,204 but it may 
be argued that any judicially ordained protection beyond the applicable 
state notice period205 warrants greater wariness, because it would actively 
entitle tenants with oral leases—which are generally construed as monthly 
or less206—to more tenancy security than they had under the pre-foreclosure 
landlord. Nonetheless, universal ninety-day (or greater) notice would 
provide protection against foreclosing mortgagees bringing mass eviction 
actions and forcing tenants to prove their leases’ validity in court, rather 
than first learning information about the tenants and their leases and using 
good faith efforts to collect rent. Additional notice requirements integrating 
tenants into the foreclosure process207 are also reasonable to protect tenants 
who lack long-term leases but have had a long, stable tenure. 
Even if defendants can provide a legally sufficient justification, 
existing state laws and the PTFA give clear and practicable models for less 
 
200 See Lighty, supra note 188, at 302–04; Rose, supra note 2, at 412–13. 
201 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612(g)(3), 3614(d) (2012) (listing increased penalties for repeat offenders); 
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 
11,474 (Feb. 15, 2013) (affirming HUD’s interpretation that disparate impact liability includes the 
possibility of damages and penalties). 
202 See, e.g., Mik v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 743 F.3d 149, 159 (6th Cir. 2014); Logan v. 
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 722 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2013); Gullatt v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. 
1:10–cv–01109–AWI–SKO, 2010 WL 4070379, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2010). 
203 For instance, in Illinois a landlord who brings an eviction action without appropriate prior 
notice simply has her case dismissed, and may bring a new action after properly notifying the tenant. 
No further remedy is provided for a landlord’s failure to give notice prior to filing an eviction action. 
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-104 (2014) (detailing the notice requirement, but providing no additional 
consequences for noncompliance). 
204 Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 702(a)(2)(B), 123 Stat. 1660, 1661 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5220 (2012)). 
205 See NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., supra note 38. 
206 See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1224 (2014); MO. ANN. STAT. § 441.060 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016 Sess.). 
207 These notice requirements would resemble what Professor Henry Rose argues are necessary for 
due process. Rose, supra note 2, at 419 (arguing that due process requires that tenants have notice of, 
and opportunity to contest, a foreclosure). 
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discriminatory alternatives. Because these alternate practices do not cause 
significant harm to mortgagees and may actually be better for housing 
markets than a lease-extinguishing foreclosure regime, tenants in 
foreclosure have a convincing case that judicially ordered protections are 
both appropriate and necessary to avoid widespread racially weighted 
eviction of innocent renters. 
CONCLUSION 
Mass eviction of tenants in foreclosure has a demonstrable disparate 
impact on minority communities and families, without a legally sufficient 
justification. Policy interests in maximally efficient use of property are 
better served by alternate practices that protect tenants from unexpected 
displacement and keep buildings from sitting vacant. Of course, the most 
likely alternative practices could always be enacted by Congress through a 
renewal of the PTFA or another PTFA-like law. Even if Congress 
eventually passes such a law, achievement of a disparate impact remedy 
through the courts would not be a hollow or purely stopgap victory. This is 
both because the Fair Housing Act offers advantageous remedies that the 
PTFA and many existing state laws do not, and because a court victory for 
tenants in foreclosure would signal an increasing judicial cognizance of 
renters’ vital yet vulnerable role in the modern housing marketplace. 
More Americans are renting than ever, but renters are historically a 
politically disempowered group, often lacking a meaningful democratic 
influence when pitted against the preferences of landowners or politically 
influential mortgagees; this at least partially explains the uniquely outsized 
role courts have played in advancing tenants’ basic protections through 
various common law doctrines. Among those who rent, a disproportionate 
number are lower income black and Latino individuals and families, for 
whom the security of rented homes is particularly imperative. Against this 
backdrop, a disparate impact victory for tenants in foreclosure would be a 
new shield against sudden displacement of families: it would signal that 
even longstanding housing policies are not outside the reach of the Fair 
Housing Act if they displace families and disregard the basic security of the 
home along racial lines, without a pressing justification. Such policies lie at 
the “heartland” of disparate impact. 
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